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WELCOME 
DEAN TREANOR: Good evening, everyone.  My name is Bill 
Treanor.  I am the Dean of Fordham Law School.  It’s my pleasure to 
welcome you to our program tonight, Corporate Accountability: 
Governance and Compensation Issues. 
I’ll be turning matters over to Professor Gus Katsoris in a minute, 
but I want to make a few welcoming remarks. 
I have to say this is an amazing panel.  Our Corporate Law Center 
does great event after great event, but even within the history of our 
Corporate Law Center, this is really a standout event. 
At Fordham Law, we take business law very seriously.  It’s really at 
the core of what we do, and we have an amazing business law faculty, 
and we’re joined by some of them tonight.  I’d like to recognize 
Professor Martin Gelter, Professor Richard Squire, and Professor Gus 
Katsoris, who are all mainstays of our great program. 
We have a phenomenal Corporate Law Center, which was created 
in 2001 and since that time has done an amazing job of strengthening the 
business law program at Fordham.  The Chair of the Corporate Law 
Center Board of Advisors is Paul Soden, who joins us, as well as two 
Board Members, Pamela Chepiga and Bob Hollweg. 
The Director of the Corporate Law Center, Ann Rakoff, really 
worked long and hard and did so much to put together this fabulous 
program.  She was assisted by Zach Slates, who is our Corporate Law 
Center Fellow, and by Jeanne Rosendale, who really did so much to help 
bring this evening together. 
I’d like to express the Law School’s great gratitude to the Becker 
Ross firm for their generosity in establishing the DeStefano Lecture 
Series.  We’re delighted to have Howard Justvig and his wife Flora with 
us tonight. 
We also have, from the Pace School of Business, Professor John 
James, who has brought a dozen students from his MBA class in 
comparative corporate governance. 
I just want to make you aware that we have other great programs 
coming up.  This Friday, March12, we’ll be having an all-day academic 
conference on New Ideas for Limiting Bank Size.  And then, on March 
31, there will be a lecture by Ken Feinberg, TARP Special Master for 
Executive Compensation. 
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And, as we do all of these things, we work very closely with our 
great Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, which has been 
cited by the Supreme Court.  It’s one of the top five corporate law 
journals in the country.  It has fabulous leadership.  Thank you very 
much. 
Without any further ado, let me turn matters over to our legendary 
business law faculty member, Constantine “Gus” Katsoris.   
 
OPENING REMARKS 
PROF. KATSORIS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. 
On behalf of the DeStefano family, I’d like to welcome you here 
tonight.  Unfortunately, they could not be with us, but they send their 
regrets and their best wishes. 
For those of you who have never met Al DeStefano, let me briefly 
describe him to you.  He started at Fordham Law School as an evening 
student, worked during the day, still managed to make the Law Review, 
and graduated at the top of his class.  He then went on to become a 
partner in the Becker firm, specializing in corporate matters, particularly 
mergers and acquisitions.  In his spare time, he devoted himself to 
numerous charitable endeavors and, as an adjunct professor on our 
faculty, shared his enormous knowledge and experience with our 
students. 
In short, Al DeStefano was a symbol of what Fordham Law School 
was in the past, he is a symbol of what Fordham Law School still is, and 
he will remain a symbol of what Fordham Law School will be in the 
future. 
Since its inception less than a decade ago, the DeStefano Lectures 
have covered a wide range of timely and diverse topics, such as: the 
need for market regulation, the demise of Enron and its auditor Arthur 
Andersen, strengthening the protection for investors, making our capital 
markets more transparent and, last year, the subprime mortgage 
meltdown.  Sadly, the effects of that meltdown still linger, resulting in 
what many call the Great Recession. 
Interestingly, everybody is busy blaming everybody else for the 
meltdown.  The truth is many must share the blame, starting with the 
mortgage brokers; the loan reviewers who applied few, if any, standards; 
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there were also the lenders and investment bankers, who 
indiscriminately packaged subprime mortgages into securities and sold 
them throughout the world; there were the insurance, securities, and 
bank regulators, who seemed oblivious to the risks; and finally, the 
rating agencies that overrated the safety of these products.  Ironically, 
many of the politicians who now seek reforms or reelection must also 
bear some of the responsibility for either creating or fostering some of 
the programs that inflated the bubble, or by simply ignoring many of the 
warning signals along the way. 
In short, to borrow a phrase from the past describing a different 
economic crisis, “where were the professionals when these improper 
transactions were being consummated?”  These words appeared in an 
opinion issued by Judge Sporkin in upholding the federal seizure of the 
Lincoln Savings & Loan Association some thirty years ago.  They were 
appropriate then and they are still relevant today. 
Shareholders are also to be faulted for not taking a more active 
interest in the companies they owned, instead of relying upon the self-
serving rhetoric of their CEOs that “shareholder value” was being 
created, only to be subsequently shocked when the enormous retirement 
packages were paid to executives as they were exiting and leaving their 
companies in shambles. 
There is no question that a major contributing factor to the Great 
Recession was greed — greed that sought short-term gain regardless of 
the long-term consequences, greed that often assumed risk could be 
passed on to counterparties, ignoring the fact that the risk did not go 
away and remained in the financial system. 
Sadly, this game of Russian roulette was engaged in not only by 
speculators, but also by regulated banks and insurance companies. 
Feeding this greed that led to our present dilemma was the method 
by which we compensated corporate executives, by encouraging them to 
engage in this enormous risk-taking — not with their own money, but 
with that of the shareholders and others.  This is one of the topics our 
panel will discuss tonight, excessive executive compensation. 
About six months ago, we were privileged to host a special lecture 
in this very room by William Dudley, President of the New York 
Federal Reserve, who eloquently discussed the financial meltdown as of 
last year.  It was a few days after Ken Lewis had announced his 
retirement as Chairman of Bank of America and a search committee had 
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been formed.  Ken Feinberg had already become the “salary czar.” 
At the end of the lecture, in the question-and-answer period, I 
pointed out that although some governmental oversight was clearly 
understandable, it should not be “penny wise and pound foolish” so as to 
be counterproductive in the search to get a competent CEO for a very 
difficult job.  I then asked the question, that if he, Mr. Dudley, and I 
were on the Bank of America search committee, where would we look 
for a successor, what type of person would we look for, what type of 
compensation would be necessary to induce the proper person to take 
the job, and to what extent should the government influence the process? 
That was six months ago.  A lot has happened since then in the 
board rooms of companies like AIG, GMAC, General Motors, Bank of 
America, and even with companies like Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley, as they reformulated their compensation packages in seeking to 
avoid public wrath and indignation regarding executive compensation. 
Tonight, we are privileged to have with us an extraordinary panel of 
experts.  On behalf of corporate America, as it looks to the future and as 
it looks for guidance, I ask the same question of the panel tonight: if you 
and I were on such a search committee, where would you look, who 
would you look for, how much would you pay, and what form would 
that compensation take, and, in the process, what input should you 
expect from the government? 
I would now like to say a few words about tonight’s moderator, our 
chairman of the panel, Judge Sporkin, and then he will introduce the rest 
of the panel. 
After graduating from Yale Law School in 1957 — which, 
incidentally, was the year I graduated from Fordham Law School — he 
worked in private practice for a few years, and in 1961 he became a staff 
attorney at the SEC.  In 1974, he became Chief of the Enforcement 
Division, where he served for eight years in that capacity.  Thereafter, he 
served as General Counsel to the CIA for five years, until he was 
appointed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by 
President Reagan, where he presided over many notable and high-profile 
cases.  Upon retirement from the bench, he returned to private practice. 
Throughout his career, he has always championed the public 
interest and relentlessly sought the pursuit of justice.  In short, Stanley 
Sporkin is no shrinking violet.  Indeed, he is a no-nonsense, two-fisted 
public servant. 
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On the other hand, I can also personally attest to his softer side.  As 
you know, in academia we have a saying: “publish or perish.”  Thus, out 
of necessity, in order to survive in academia, from time to time I was 
forced to publish various articles, which I distributed to a select captive 
audience.  They are captive because once you are on the list you never 
get off until one of us dies.  Judge Sporkin is on that list. 
More often than not, like a bill collector who sends out overdue 
statements, I rarely hear from this select group once they receive one of 
my articles.  But not Judge Sporkin.  He would take the time out to 
courteously acknowledge receipt and graciously encourage me to write 
again.  Most importantly, he has never asked to be taken off that list. 
Ladies and gentlemen, it is with great pleasure that I introduce to 
you The Honorable Stanley Sporkin. 
 
 
PANEL DISCUSSION 
JUDGE SPORKIN: That was terrific.  Great introduction. 
I didn’t know I was going to be offered a job as the head of the 
Bank of America today.  I seem to fit that bill.  I don’t know if my wife 
would like living in North Carolina. 
I see a number of old friends in the audience here today.  Of course, 
Jeanne Rosendale, Ann Rakoff, and Judge Rakoff are here today, and we 
are very grateful to have them.  I see Simon Lorne, Jim Buck, Ed 
Fleischman, and many good old friends here. 
We’re going to discuss a number of subjects.  But the first thing I 
want to do is give short introductions and offer no jobs to the panel.  I 
don’t have any to offer. 
Todd Lang is an old associate of mine, really one of the great 
people in the legal profession.  While I could go through and say he 
graduated from Yale Law School and all that other stuff, what I really 
admire about him is he, along with Ira Millstein and Harvey Miller, in 
effect started their own firm in the late 1950s or early 1960s.  Would 
you believe, that firm started by these three people is now in competition 
with the best in the world — not the best in America, the best in the 
world?  Anybody that can do that is really an outstanding lawyer. 
Gary Naftalis beat you, Todd, because his law firm, Kramer Levin, 
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has his name in the firm.  You need to get your name in the firm.  Gary 
and I go back again — what do you figure, sixty years? — and we’ve 
been friends ever since.  He is not only a great lawyer, but he is a decent 
human being.  Our friendship has shown that.  He, of course, graduated 
from Columbia Law School and Brown University. 
The other two people are just as distinguished. 
Jeffrey Sonnenfeld has a tremendous record at Yale.  Business 
Week called Mr. Sonnenfeld one of the world’s ten most influential 
business school professors, and Directorship magazine listed him among 
the hundred most influential figures in corporate governance.  He is now 
the Lester Crown Professor of Management Practice at the Yale School 
of Management — for which I take my hat off to him, because when I 
was at Yale they didn’t want to get involved in any of this financial 
stuff; they thought it was too much like plumbing. 
Then we have Louise Story, who writes for The New York Times.  
She graduated from Yale and Columbia University.  Again, she is going 
to be one of the great writers.  In addition to being a publicist for Judge 
Rakoff, she has done some very great work on her own.  And he needs 
no publicist, believe me. 
Let me just quickly start out. 
We keep looking at what has happened in this great meltdown.  We 
look at it in the terms that we know — the financial upheaval, the fact 
that we went from a problem in connection with a real estate problem 
and turned it into a financial problem. 
Well, the problem there was we’ve had real estate problems in the 
past.  They never became a financial problem.  They became a financial 
problem when we took the wall down.  We securitized the real estate, 
and of course when the real estate collapsed, so began the financial 
collapse. 
But let me take you a step back.  It’s my contention — and it’s 
something that I spoke on years ago, before the current administration 
said, “Hey, we think the problem is jobs.”  Of course it’s jobs.  We 
screwed this country up so badly over the years that when I now look 
back, I cannot believe it. 
Did we see what was going to happen when we let all our jobs from 
this nation go overseas?  And now we’re saying, “people can’t pay for 
the real estate.”  Of course they can’t. 
I just read in the newspaper a little while back — a person was 
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describing a town in Massachusetts called Palmer.  This is what the 
article said: 
In this once prosperous, now depressed, former mill town in western 
Massachusetts, residents casually rattle off the names of all the 
factories that shut down long ago and of the businesses getting ready 
to leave.  ‘Everything is closing down,’ said Robin Moriarty, who 
has worked here in her father’s corner grocery store since she was in 
high school.  The video place wants to close; Comcast closed; there 
was a fruit company across the street, they left; the taxi company 
wants to close; there was a flower shop across the street, she’s gone.  
That’s what’s happened.  It’s a ghost town.  We allowed these jobs 
to go.  Where did they go?  They went to countries based upon the 
fact that they’re not paying competitive wages, slave labor. 
And everybody’s to blame.  I even place some of the blame on the 
unions.  Somebody, when I was talking about this to a union person, 
said, “How dare you?” 
I said, “What you did is you gave cover to the business people to 
leave this country.” 
That’s what happened.  Unless we deal with that problem, we’re 
never going to get out of this mess.  And it’s a very, very difficult 
problem to start bringing back these jobs. 
Now, the governor of Massachusetts had a solution for the problem 
in Palmer. 
Does anybody know who is going to bring back industry to Palmer?  
Does anybody know what the industry was going to be?  Can you guess 
how they’re going to resurrect this little mill town? 
Gambling.  So those are the jobs we’re going to create.  You can 
see what that’s all about. 
But really, to start blaming jobs and the financial markets we would 
be dealing with judgments and not the root cause.  The financial markets 
certainly do not get any glory out of what happened.  Surely they could 
have done a much better job, but you’ve still got to get to the root cause 
in order to solve the problem.  I hope we can get better economists now 
who can help us and stop talking in slogans — “free trade,” “free this” 
and “free that.”  It isn’t going to work. 
We’ve really got to drill down and go right back to the basics and 
start creating and bringing in jobs, creating real companies.  We don’t 
even have — if we were in a national security crisis matter — the 
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wherewithal to create implements of war.  Where are we going to go?  
Indeed, recently we had to go to a French company to build some of the 
airplanes needed by the Air Force. 
Sure, I was in favor of bailing out General Motors, because we need 
General Motors if we have a national security threat and have to build 
heavy duty tanks and artillery.  We can’t strip this country of things of 
that kind. 
At this time I’m going to ask Todd to get back into the real world of 
finance and talk a little bit about the proxy issues. 
Go ahead, Todd. 
 
MR. LANG: Okay. 
For me, talking about proxy access is the “seven-year itch.”  The 
reason is that about seven years ago the SEC initially put out a concept 
release on the subject, and it then proposed a rule.  I won’t burden you 
with all the intervening details, but this has been live action up to this 
past June, when the SEC made a proxy access proposal. 
It consists of 250 pages and propounds over 500 questions.  The 
subject matter is complex and it is very controversial. 
The proxy access regime will apply to more than 10,000 publicly 
held corporations, each with its own capital and voting structure, and 
other relevant arrangements that may be affected by the creation of an 
access right. 
A clear definition of the purpose of the creation of that right is key 
to establish the parameters of access and avoid its use for other 
purposes. 
The SEC in its Proposing Release asserts there are two purposes to 
the access rulemaking initiative which it had undertaken.  The first is “to 
remove an impediment to the ability of shareholders to nominate and 
elect directors.”  The second is “to enable long-term holders of a 
meaningful number of shares of a corporation to use the corporation’s 
proxy materials to nominate a limited number of candidates for election 
as directors, but with no control, intent, or effect.”  That is very 
important. 
Thus, the category of eligible shareholder is for the most part 
institutions and others who exercise their governance rights but who do 
not have a control or other comparable agenda or planned activity. 
If the access rulemaking occurs, there will be no impediment.  So 
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the purpose would primarily be to that other category of shareholder 
which I mentioned. 
Final rulemaking will provide criteria for the eligibility of a 
proponent shareholder or group of shareholders, as well as the maximum 
number of access directors who may be elected annually and in the 
aggregate.  Candidates will likely be independent of the corporation 
under the objective director independence rules of the stock exchanges 
with, at least as proposed, no independence requirement in relation to 
the sponsor.  That is a highly contentious issue. 
There will be numerous other provisions, including the means of 
establishing priority in the situation where there is more than one 
eligible shareholder who seeks to exercise the right in a specific election. 
There also will be modification or elimination of the director 
election exclusion under Rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule. 
The SEC’s proposal establishes an access right by means of what is 
called a prescriptive rule.  Thus, primary terms of access are established 
by the SEC and can only be modified by a rule change or interpreted 
through an advisory opinion under the SEC’s no-action process. 
It seems as if such a prescriptive rule would preempt governance 
structures and arrangements of individual corporations.  This raises a 
federal-state issue in terms of jurisdiction in such matters of corporate 
governance. 
One practical effect of a prescriptive rule is that it could limit the 
ability of the corporation and its shareholders to adapt the access right to 
the existing corporate structure and arrangements, and deal with future 
opportunities and needs. 
In passing, note there is a longstanding question as to the authority 
of the SEC to adopt such a rule, but legislation is pending in Congress 
which seeks to provide that authority. 
Access does not exist under state law, except in North Dakota.  
Under state law generally, bylaws would be the customary means of 
providing a right of access, taking into account the individual corporate 
structure and governance arrangements.  There is, therefore, a tension 
between enabling corporations to adopt such bylaws and the desirability 
and right of the federal agency to prescribe such rules. 
In addition, a matter of considerable concern is the workability of 
the prescriptive rule.  It seems clear that private ordering would be a 
preferable vehicle to establish an access right for the defined purpose 
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and, among other advantages, to avoid workability concerns. 
Final rulemaking may take some or all of this into account and 
make some provision for private ordering.  It also may enable 
shareholders — not directors — to vote to opt out of an access regime 
or, in the alternative, to opt into one.  Another possibility is the SEC will 
adopt a default rule establishing a prescriptive right of access after a 
transition period for those corporations who have not adopted and 
maintained an appropriate access bylaw. 
It is anticipated that final rulemaking will be achieved soon.  But 
there is no firm deadline.  We’ve heard this before and the date for final 
rulemaking continues to be extended. 
It is also anticipated that there is going to be an extensive transition 
period after adoption, to enable corporations and their shareholders to 
adjust to the new rule and to comply with newly created disclosure and 
filing requirements. 
I was asked to define access in a nutshell, meaning five minutes.  I 
probably have adhered to that, sort of.  But I’ve only given you the 
highlights.  There is a great deal more. 
In this case, the devil may well be in the details.  Let’s all stay 
tuned, because this initiative is likely to enter a new active phase in the 
very near future. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Todd, let me ask you this question.  Can 
corporate democracy really work?  Can there be a democratic way for 
the shareholders to vote and elect management that would carry out their 
wishes? 
 
MR. LANG: Let me answer it this way.  The whole voting system 
is under reconsideration, because there are a lot of problems with it.  It 
hasn’t kept up with technology; votes are not accurately counted all the 
time; shareholders are not the record owners of shares and often don’t 
vote themselves since intermediaries vote their interests in the complex 
voting process; and proxy advisors have significant influence on how 
shares are voted.  And so the answer is that “democracy” is a political 
term, not descriptive of the actual corporate voting system. 
I think you can have a greater participation by shareholders in the 
process through a variety of means, and many people are working on 
that project.  The SEC has an education group working on trying to 
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communicate with shareholders in plain English so they will be better 
able to exercise their voting rights. 
When you talk about shareholders, who are they?  I mean 
shareholders’ stock is often voted by others — it used to be brokers, not 
as much anymore. Their financial interest is often voted by pension 
trusts, unions, and other intermediaries and investment vehicles.  Hedge 
funds know how to vote their own shares and they have their own 
money to back it up.  In reality, the individual retail shareholder does a 
limited amount of voting of his or her shares directly.  To compound the 
problem, proxy materials are complex and often difficult to understand, 
which in turn poses a difficulty for shareholders in terms of making 
informed voting decisions. 
So I think the objective is to protect the voting franchise, and 
educate shareholders with respect to voting matters.  This should 
enhance the democratic features of the voting system. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Louise, we’re going to have this wonderful 
proxy system.  What about the pay involved in these?  In other words, 
when I become the CEO of Bank of America, how shall I determine how 
much I should be paid? 
 
MS. STORY: Pay has been one of the major controversies of this 
crisis.  It is one of the issues that everyone can understand.  We and the 
rest of the media have written about it a lot. 
What I find interesting is that now we are not that far away on pay 
than we were a year ago.  If you remember, in January 2009, President 
Obama called the Wall Street bonuses “shameful.”  He was talking then 
about the 2008 bonuses, but it was January 2009, and he called the 2008 
bonuses “shameful.”  We’re back now with pay going up. 
So one of the things that a lot of people in the government have said 
is that shareholders, through voting and the proxy and things like “say 
on pay,” might help rein pay in.  But I think that is going to have limited 
effect because shareholders would only vote on the very top executive 
pay.  The vote is often not binding, and the companies don’t have to 
follow it.  And then, the really unique thing about Wall Street pay is that 
people 100 deep in the company, or even 1,000 deep in the company, are 
often making millions of dollars and taking on big risks for the 
companies.  So on Wall Street it may bear fruit for the government to 
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vote on. 
So I am a little skeptical that the proxy initiatives “say on pay” are 
going to change Wall Street pay in a big way. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: What do you think?  If you were going to 
design a system involving your government, how far can the 
government go in telling these people how much they should be paid 
under our system? 
 
MS. STORY: Well, the problem is that they appointed this 
Compensation Special Master, Ken Feinberg, who will be speaking here 
soon, so you all can put questions to him.  But the problem is he was 
only appointed to oversee pay at companies that still had an exceptional 
amount of bailout money.  And so by the time he got going, Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, so many of the companies, had returned their 
money and he was only really overseeing Bank of America and 
Citigroup as for the big banks.  He will not oversee Bank of America 
and Citigroup this year.  They have already returned most of their 
money, in the case of Citigroup, and Bank of America has returned it all. 
So I think that one thing the government should rethink is, even 
though these companies are no longer beholden to the government for 
bailout money, given that there is this implicit “too big to fail” belief 
now, does that mean that there should be someone other than 
shareholders that have a say?  Because you know that if companies take 
big risks and we’re going to bail them out again, there may be some 
lasting role that the government should play in pay, which is a break 
from the past if they were to do it. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Is there anybody that thinks that under our 
form of government that we could really tell a private company how 
much they can pay their executives?  Todd or anybody join in.  Is there a 
theory, other than if they are taking federal money? But if there is no 
reliance on federal money?  Can we — I guess we could do it through 
the taxing system, can’t we? 
 
MR. LANG: I don’t think so.  I mean we had a war.  We had price 
controls and wage controls.  We had a Wage Stabilization Board, and 
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they set all the rules and so forth.  But you have to have that kind of 
crisis to justify that. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: But isn’t there a rule that talks about if 
somebody gets over $1 million in pay? 
 
MR. LANG: It is Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: What does that say?  You’ve got to familiarize 
us. 
 
MR. LANG: The corporation cannot deduct more than $1 million in 
compensation for defined executives unless it has earned it in a 
particular way, and satisfying that test has gotten tougher. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: So you can’t deduct it? 
 
MR. LANG: The deduction is limited as I indicated. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: So in other words, under the taxing power, 
what you are saying is there is a limited way of the federal government 
to involve itself in pay, right?  They could do it that way.  They could 
assess a surtax.  They could do a lot of things, couldn’t they? 
 
MR. LANG: Stanley, it hasn’t worked. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: I’m not saying whether it’s going to work.  I’m 
trying to find out whether they have the ability to do it.  You’re probably 
right.  Believe me, I’m not here suggesting it. 
 
MR. LANG: Just let me say this.  The tax law has been used a few 
times, including golden parachutes, but people have negotiated around 
it, and there are exceptions because Congress had a limit as to what it 
wanted to do. 
So the question now is: under present circumstances, with the 
public mood being what it is, are there other things that can be done 
other than saying, “we’re going to have good practices, more disclosure, 
and we are going to try to limit compensation on a sensible basis rather 
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JUDGE SPORKIN: Louise, would you have any other suggestions? 
 
MS. STORY: Yes.  I think that in this “too big to fail” legislation 
that is in Congress, it is possible the government could create a new 
rationale for a government rule on pay, because it is not enough to say 
that they can regulate pay once a company takes bailouts.  Companies 
now have an implicit guarantee that the government will bail them out.  
So I think it is possible that they could develop a new rationale based on 
that. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Very interesting. 
All right.  Let’s talk to the Dean.  Dean Sonnenfeld, what do you 
have to say about the latest in corporate governance? 
 
PROFESSOR SONNENFELD: Well, that’s a big question.  It’s 
almost as big as Ricardo’s Theory of Comparative Advantage you 
opened with.  There’s a lot to master in one panel. 
I think that this is something which really stands out in corporate 
governance that might be a little bit contrarian with the direction of the 
panel so far.  I don’t know where Gary is going to come out, but I kind 
of feel like the mosquito in a nudist colony.  I hardly know where to 
strike first here, Judge. 
I think there are real limits to the law in this whole debate.  Whether 
or not it is compensation or the larger governance arenas, the law is a 
tool, a largely inadequate and clumsy tool, to get to something that is our 
objective.  We are looking at personal accountability of our leaders.  
Corporate accountability is a byproduct of that.  We want smart, 
informed, hardworking, long-term-oriented folks that are responsive to 
their shareholders and their communities, and with some personal 
integrity. 
Louise, I’d differ with you a little bit about what the results of Ken 
Feinberg’s interventions are, because it speaks again to the limits of the 
law.  You’re right; legally he is constrained to just over 100 executives.  
And yet, I think he has had an enormous effect in bringing in a kind of 
personal accountability to this, because there is a cultural issue. 
If you take a look at what Jeff Immelt said in a speech recently, or 
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what he did as CEO of GE, to forgo his bonus, that’s a big deal.  He just 
said: 
We are at the end of a difficult generation of business leadership, and 
maybe leadership in general.  Tough-mindedness, a good trait, was 
replaced by meanness and greed - terrible traits.  As a result, the 
bottom 25% of America is poorer than they were twenty-five years 
ago, and that’s just plain wrong.  Rewards became perverted.  The 
richest people made the most mistakes with the least accountability.  
In too many situations, leaders divided us instead of bringing us 
together. 
What has happened as a result, I think in part, of the model that Ken 
Feinberg has set, as limited as he was to those people, is we see Jeff 
Kindler at Pfizer forgoing much of his bonus; we see at Morgan Stanley 
the outgoing CEO and the incoming CEO taking the same path; at 
Citigroup somebody I’ve been very critical of — I have to admit he has 
grown a lot in office — has been taking $1.00 a year, forgoing his 
bonuses; the CEO of Coke — and it goes on and on and on.  We didn’t 
see this before.  Many of the titans of industry have been deciding that 
shame and accountability matter.  It is not going to be legislated or 
litigated.  It is a sense of responsibility. 
The boards are picking up on this little by little.  I thought that 
when the WorldCom board and the Enron board were found to be 
accountable and liable — it was very limited you could say in that same 
case — all other directors got scared. 
I think Delaware badly mishandled the Eisner/Ovitz situation and 
the board got away with perhaps being inept.  But it scared directors 
everywhere. 
Their law was very limited, but it put — was it Samuel Johnson 
who said, “Nothing so focuses the mind like the prospect of a hanging”?  
You know, the law’s limits, rather than the law’s reach, often is where 
some of the biggest things happen.  Shame and accountability — I think 
that’s the danger that we are seeing. 
One of the problems with boards is groupthink — not how 
independent they are.  You know, the fact that everybody on this panel 
has a strong Yale connection doesn’t invalidate us.  Groupthink, do we 
think the same way?  I don’t think we do.  Do you have bystander 
apathy?  Do you have obedience to authority, although we do respect the 
Judge?  Is that cowardice or courage? 
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I think that’s what the Bank of America decision brings out for us.  
Some people may be disappointed that we couldn’t see ultimately 
slapping down the Bank of America for trying to — the SEC didn’t find 
individuals personally accountable.  But the message came out, if you 
will, from the Judge — I won’t even look your way, so you don’t have 
to even acknowledge — is that a message went out that personal 
accountability matters. 
I went off and took a look at forest products industry executives in 
1978.  They were the same companies.  In some cases, some of the same 
individuals went to prison for fixing prices in multi-wall bags and 
corrugated containers and folding cartons.  The same companies were 
hit again and again.  Why?  There was just a little slap on the wrist of the 
company.  There was no personal accountability. 
Two CEOs back in Xerox in this post-Sarbanes-Oxley era.  The 
CEO and the president violated — egregious financial fraud issues.  
Who was responsible?  The shareholders paid the price, and nobody 
else. 
That stuff has got to end.  Personal accountability — even when it 
doesn’t happen legally, the shareholders and CEOs are more and more 
getting the message.  So I think that is the big change. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Let me ask you something.  If we have this 
great democracy and you have people elected to the board whose 
interests are contrary to the workings of the company and to what it 
stands for, under corporate governance, how does a company deal with 
that?  It’s almost like the Hewlett-Packard situation.  That’s why the 
question I asked Todd before: does democracy really work?  Suppose 
you have people fighting on the board; is that going to be good for the 
corporation? 
 
PROFESSOR SONNENFELD: I think that’s a great question.  
Dissent is a good thing.  Dissent is not necessarily disloyalty.  In that 
particular situation, the dissent was, surprisingly, the chairwoman 
herself, Patty Dunn, who had the temerity to lead an investigation that 
the full board had asked for, but then when they surfaced who the bad 
guy was, supposedly somebody named Jay Keyworth, another director 
ran cover for him and tried to suppress the whole thing.  But the fact is 
the dissent itself was a good thing.  The bad thing was that confidential 
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discussions were being leaked to the outside.  So I think on that part, 
dissent is good. 
But the other side is, Judge, if you will, that what worries some 
about the kinds of things that Todd is pursuing — and I completely 
applaud Todd — nonetheless, people are worried about dissent when it 
comes to the campaign for office.  People don’t want to be part of a 
competitive slate of rival candidacies.  If the board becomes parallel to a 
municipal city council meeting or a student council meeting, you are 
going to see quality people run for the hills the way we, sadly, 
sometimes do in public office. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: All right.  Gary? 
 
MR. LANG: Could I make one point? 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Sure. 
 
MR. LANG: The model for a well-run board comes from private 
equity.  People are smart.  They have money.  They take control of a 
company.  They assist management because they know what they are 
doing and ultimately they will sell out because exiting is part of their 
strategy.  But that is considered to be a role model of what a company 
ought to have — smart directors, people who know what they are doing, 
with money on the line for themselves. 
This approximates what Bob Pozen said in his book.  What he is 
saying is financial institutions should have a few super-directors who 
give three to four days a month to this work and who are experienced in 
financial matters.  That’s the way we ought to be running some of these 
kinds of companies since expertise is combined with the dedication of a 
substantial time to the task.  I think there is a lot to that. 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: And they have real risk there.  It isn’t 
other people’s money.  That’s why they become billionaires.  It’s their 
own money at risk, and we applaud it.  We don’t want limits on that. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Gary, let me ask you this question.  The SEC 
over the years brings a lot of consent decrees.  Up until recent times, 
they would take it to a judge and the judge would agree to it.  Then we 
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find in a recent case that a judge says he’s not going to be a rubber 
stamp.  There used to be a judge who, one time when the government 
came to him with a consent decree, asked whether he could use his own 
pen to sign the decree.  What do you think of this new thing of the courts 
substituting their judgment for a regulatory agency?  Have you thought 
about it?  Have you been involved in it? 
 
MR. NAFTALIS: Yes, I’ve thought about what this development 
means for the system. 
I think the question you raised, Stan, is an interesting one. 
Historically, at least based on my anecdotal memory, I don’t ever 
remember a single SEC consent decree that was negotiated by both sides 
being the subject of any particular judicial scrutiny.  The lawyers would 
present the document to the Court, it would be entered, and that would 
be it. 
Indeed, the pattern was really not dissimilar to that of private civil 
litigation, where judges really generally don’t get involved.  If I sue 
somebody and we decide to settle our dispute, the judge is happy to have 
the case removed from his or her calendar — save for the class action 
area and a few others, where the fairness of the settlement had to be 
appraised by the Court. 
I think what we have here may well be a dramatic change in how 
judges exercise their power with regard to consent decrees.  The law 
says — and I think Judge Rakoff referred to it in both of his opinions — 
that when you are dealing with a public agency, before you approve a 
consent decree which implicates the contempt power of the federal court 
— that is, if somebody violates the injunction, they can be held in 
contempt — you are supposed to find that the settlement is fair, that it is 
adequate, that it is reasonable, and that it is in the public interest. 
That was the justification for Judge Rakoff’s decision not to 
approve the initial Bank of America settlement.  The Court’s opinion 
turned for the most part on the fact that the Court was concerned — 
assuming there was a nondisclosure, and assuming the nondisclosure 
was actionable under the securities laws — that the settlement was being 
paid for by the victims.  The shareholders themselves, who had not 
received the information, were the ones who were paying the fine.  That 
struck the Court as neither appropriate nor in the public interest.  Judge 
Rakoff did rely on a legal authority I had never heard of before, Oscar 
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Wilde, quoting his famous definition of a cynic – someone “who knows 
the price of everything and the value of nothing.” I had read some of 
Wilde’s work before, but not in the legal setting.  In any event, Judge 
Rakoff sent the parties out to either go to trial or to come back with a 
settlement that would pass muster under the applicable standards. 
The parties did come back several months later, just last month, 
with a new settlement that the Court approved.  Judge Rakoff changed 
legal authorities though.  He no longer was willing to rely on Oscar 
Wilde.  He relied instead on a saying of the legal philosopher Yogi 
Berra, “I wish I had an answer to that because I’m getting tired of 
answering that question.”  Apparently, Yogi is pro-settlement while 
Oscar is anti-settlement. 
What I think is interesting is the Court’s analysis in the second 
Bank of America case.  In addition to relying on the standards that this 
settlement had to be fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the public interest, 
Judge Rakoff said, “the law requires the Court to give substantial 
deference to the SEC as the regulatory body having primary 
responsibility for policing securities markets, especially with matters of 
transparency.  While such deference can never be absolute, since the 
judgment ultimately entered is the Court’s and is enforceable by the 
Court’s contempt power” — which in fact he had noted in the first 
opinion — “the Court will fail in its duty if it did not give considerable 
weight to the SEC’s position.” 
The Judge, in determining the fairness of the settlement, actually 
looked at the evidentiary materials and agreed with the SEC’s position 
that the nondisclosure was the product of negligence, and was a 
reasonable, well-grounded position.  The Court agreed that, as a matter 
of deference, it would approve the settlement, which at that point 
included two nondisclosure violations: (1) the bonuses paid to Merrill 
executives; and (2) that Merrill was suffering historically great losses in 
the fourth quarter of 2008. 
The Court also pointed out that considerations of judicial restraint 
require that  Federal judges have to defer, if in fact the settlement is fair, 
reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest. 
What’s interesting is that the parties came back with a series of 
prophylactic measures which were not in the first settlement.  One was 
the retention of an independent auditor to review the bank’s controls, 
which reminded me, Judge Sporkin, of the old days when we used to put 
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all that stuff in the old SEC consents.  Another was requiring the 
retention of independent disclosure counsel.  As to both measures, the 
Court convinced the parties that if the SEC and Bank of America didn’t 
agree on who would be retained, that the Court would have the final say. 
As to a third prophylactic measure, the retention of a compensation 
consultant, Bank of America indicated that they thought that was 
appropriately a matter of their own corporate governance and who 
would be selected should not be the SEC’s call, nor should it be 
determined by the Court. 
The question that now remains: to what extent are courts now going 
to give enhanced scrutiny to SEC consent decrees?  I think Professor 
Coffee of Columbia has indicated he thought that this will open the door 
to much greater scrutiny.  Certainly, in issues where companies have 
received TARP funds, that opens the door to greater scrutiny. 
A countervailing point is that individuals as well as corporations do 
settle SEC cases all the time.  Even though they may not necessarily be 
guilty of the offense, they may not have the economic wherewithal to 
fight the case.  They also may not have the emotional wherewithal to 
fight the case.  People just want to get on with their lives.  So there is 
that other countervailing dynamic in the settlement process. 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: Are we certain this is right?  As one of the 
two non-lawyers on the panel, I am just amazed.  Judge, you obviously 
were a pioneer, and it made a huge difference to raise the questions you 
did.  I am in awe of what Judge Rakoff has done following in your 
wake. 
And yet, you know, I have a Philadelphia lawyer in the room, my 
brother Mark — but antitrust settlements, all the time, have come before 
judicial review.  I can come up with half-a-dozen antitrust settlements, 
and I’m not a lawyer — Food & Drug Administration reviews.  NHTSA 
right now, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s 
settlement with Toyota is coming up for judicial review.  What’s so 
unusual?  Is there something about securities law that is so godly we 
can’t challenge it the way every other law can be challenged by judicial 
review?  Mark, am I wrong? 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: In the Microsoft case, I didn’t approve the 
settlement.  They appealed me and I got reversed.  The Court of Appeals 
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said I didn’t have a right to go as far as I did. 
I had a little stronger support, I think, than even Judge Rakoff, 
because I had a law called the Tunney Act, in which the judge was 
supposed to be the gatekeeper.  It came out of a matter involving 
government corruption.  Congress said, “we’re not going to trust the 
Antitrust Division anymore.  Judges have got to be the gatekeepers.” 
So, reading the law the way I read it, I turned down the settlement.  
They appealed.  They reversed me.  And guess what happened?  I’ll bet 
you nobody here knows what happened.  Does anybody know what 
happened after that case, after they reversed me? 
Where are the students here?  Can anybody tell me what happened? 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: Constantine might know. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Anybody know?  Do you know what 
happened? 
What happened is, Congress passed a law that said, “we meant what 
we said.”  The Court of Appeals was wrong, the District Court has 
pursuant authority to review antitrust consent decrees where the DOJ is 
involved. 
Jed, did you come up against that?  Did you see that in your 
research? 
 
JUDGE RAKOFF2
 
: How could I have missed it? 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Which made me feel very good, that the 
Congress can reverse the courts, which I thought was — I used to have a 
lot of trouble with my Court of Appeals, but that’s another thing. 
In any event, I think he’s dead-on.  I mean, just think of a judge 
who is asked to put his signature on something.  It’s got to mean 
something.  If the judge feels that it isn’t right and he is uncomfortable, 
by golly, I don’t know how you can force him to sign that thing.  I don’t 
know.  That’s why I couldn’t understand my Court of Appeals.  I said, “I 
need more information.  I don’t have enough information.” 
But in any event, there is another area, which Judge Rakoff 
 
2 Judge Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, participated in the Lecture as a member of the audience. 
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realized, that agencies need deference, parties need to have certainty.  
There are a number of judges now that I am aware of that are taking 
Judge Rakoff’s viewpoint and being very careful in these settlements 
and are looking at them very closely.  I think it is probably a good trend, 
except if he wants to try the case.  I won a lunch on that.  I said he was 
going to approve it, based upon my own view, saying if I were he I 
would not want to try that case.  Maybe that was not the reason.  In any 
event, the case has been settled. 
What will happen, though, if there is too much interference, the 
SEC probably has enough ability to do its own thing.  For example, it 
has virtual injunctive power through its cease-and-desist powers.  So 
they will be able to do quite a bit on their own if they feel that it is 
necessary.  So there is going to be a little bit of tension, I think, that is 
going to occur here. 
I’m going to open it up.  For any member of the panel, any 
questions on anything that we have said here?  Go ahead. 
 
QUESTION: We hear a lot about best practices versus other 
countries.  How is our corporate governance, the cost of it, and our cost 
of managerialism in America versus Scandinavian countries? 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Anybody know the answer to that question? 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: Well, I’ll tell you, what never comes out in 
governance discussions, for a lot of reasons that might be obvious given 
who finances our country these days, is we have an imperfect 
governance system, but it is so much better than many of our major 
trading partners today. 
If we were to take a look at the average major Chinese company, 
we are not even looking at anything close.  Who represents a minority 
interest, because the government is the majority interest on most 
Chinese companies?  Who are those?  A minority person on a board, a 
director, is not representing the general corporation.  Nothing that we 
think about in terms of governance would apply in China. 
We look at South Korea, where several hundred top executives 
were rounded up — not only indicted, amazingly, in that judicial system, 
but actually convicted.  It was all overturned, they were pardoned, 
because they said, “Gee, we need these people to run the country.” 
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I think we do have to work on improving our governance, but it 
worries me that we use a pretty good system as the foil to flagellate 
ourselves.  Again, we have to do better.  I think Bank of America was 
terrible. 
We need to do better, but we should somehow get a voice of 
criticism.  I’m so glad you asked a comparative question about what is 
happening internationally.  Whether it’s the OECD or China, they use 
the United States as a whipping boy, as a scapegoat. 
MR. LANG: I think they do.  We borrow from mainly the western 
nations, not China, a great deal, and we study it, and often it is cited to 
support various governance reforms that people seek to impose. 
For example, in London there is a “comply or explain” test which is 
generally used.  It’s a sensible system.  It has been tried here, not too 
successfully, but it is something that we can put in. 
The SEC here, for example, sometimes regulates through 
disclosure.  You don’t have to have a governance committee or a 
nominating committee, but if you don’t, you’ve got to say in your proxy 
statement why.  So that’s the kind of thing that has crept in.  Some of 
that comes from overseas. 
Also, one other point.  Things are different over there culturally.  
There is a working understanding between institutions and companies 
and so forth.  We are different here.  We are spread out.  We have a 
hybrid system between states and the federal government and so forth.  
So I’m not sure most of their rules really apply to us.  We have to 
fashion our own. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Let me tell you a little bit about Germany, 
which I happen to know a little bit about.  They have two boards.  One is 
a board of the people that run the company, of the management.  The 
other is a super-board.  I have found that the problem there is that on the 
super-board are representatives from the workers through their union.  
At times, management wants to keep from the union things that they 
don’t want the union to know about.  So it’s a very difficult situation and 
one which is not very smoothly run. 
That is the kind of thing we are talking about here.  How much 
dissent do you want in your company if it is running well?  You know, 
someone is going to say, “Okay, instead of being an apple picker, we’ll 
turn it into a grape picker,” or something like that.  That’s why these 
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things are very difficult to deal with. 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: Another image we often see, Judge, of 
course, is the separation of roles, which is de rigueur in much of Europe, 
and, Todd, of course in the United Kingdom, if you think about it. 
One of your favorite colleagues, one of my close colleagues who 
was a colleague of yours, argues passionately on the separation of roles 
needing to occur here.  And yet, it has not been preventive on any of 
their governance scandals there.  Nor, if you look at Enron and 
WorldCom, we had the separation of chairman and CEO when the most 
horrendous things were happening.  It hasn’t been in any way a panacea. 
In fact, when scandals have hit at Royal Dutch Shell or other 
places, there was total confusion as to who was speaking for the 
company.  There were so many different people who claimed that they 
were the boss. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: You had two years ago — it has not been that 
long — well, I contend we have the best regulatory system in the world.  
I don’t think there’s anything like the one we have.  Whatever anyone 
says about the SEC or whatnot, it’s still the best. 
But two years ago some of our top people in government, including 
Secretary Paulson, were against tough regulation.  They were telling us 
that if we continued with SEC-type regulation and went to the prudential 
regulation of the banking organizations, all our financial business would 
go overseas.  In effect, there was competition as to who could be the 
least effective regulator. 
But you see, all of a sudden that thing blows up and everybody 
says, “What happened to all the regulators?  We need more regulation.”  
It really boggles one’s mind when I see some of these things. 
We were told, for example, a couple months ago that if we didn’t 
bail out AIG that the world was going to come to an end — and not only 
bail them out, but we had to pay everybody a hundred cents on the 
dollar. 
Then we get some hearings in Washington where Geithner testifies.  
He says, “Who, me?  I recused myself from that decision because I was 
going to become the Secretary.” 
Then they go to Paulson.  Paulson said, “I had nothing to do with 
it.”  This is documented, what I am telling you.  He said, “I had nothing 
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to do with it.  I depended upon the Fed.” 
Then they go to Bernanke.  He said, “I had nothing to do with it.” 
All I want to know is who made those decisions.  Who made the 
decision to pay people a hundred cents on the dollar?  If somebody 
would answer that question, I would love to have the answer. 
Can anybody here confirm what I’m saying?  You didn’t hear the 
same thing?  I watch C-SPAN.  That’s where I get my information.  
Bloomberg also reported this.  You can’t ask for anything better than 
Bloomberg, can you? 
 
MS. STORY: It’s true.  I was watching the hearings.  You’re right.  
I’ll vouch for you.  It’s true.  I was watching the hearings also. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Am I right? 
 
MS. STORY: Correct. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Geithner said he had nothing to do with it. 
 
MS. STORY: You’re correct.  They all said that they didn’t make 
the decision. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: It reminds me of these three drunks who are in 
a car and they crack up and they all fall out.  The cop says, “Who was 
driving?”  “None of us.  We were all sitting in the back seat.”  These 
guys were all sitting in the back seat when the country was going down 
the tubes.  Gee, I couldn’t believe it. 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: Your prior point about the overregulation 
issues is something that really hasn’t come back to be sufficiently 
accountable.  You might lay the Goldman decision or other things at the 
feet of Secretary Paulson, and people have issues that have come up 
once the dam burst as to how Paulson did or didn’t respond.  He did 
some things very well, some things not so well. 
I think his missed moment was what you were talking about.  He 
created, under great pressure from corporate America to take a look at 
these long-term issues that you opened with, Judge, about the loss of 
U.S. competitiveness, and instead it got hijacked, I think in part by a 
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Harvard Law School professor, to become an ideological rant that your 
friend, Harvey Goldschmid, your colleague, would say it was a canard, 
and he is right.  The loss of IPOs to other markets didn’t happen — we 
didn’t lose any domestic companies.  There were some international 
ones.  We are trying to create strong financial markets in Russia.  
Rosneft, the energy company, opened in the Moscow market.  We 
wanted that.  In the past it would have been here.  When the Bank of 
China opened in Hong Kong, it was a great thing.  But somehow, this 
commission under Paulson was criticizing these things, when there is in 
fact explicit U.S. policy to encourage that. 
And U.S.-originated business still happened here.  But the 
difference was we charge 7% commissions and it’s 2% and 1% 
internationally.  It was a lot cheaper to do business elsewhere.  It was a 
real canard to use this regulatory rant, and they have not been held 
accountable for it, because that was the moment we could have taken a 
look at the mismanagement of risk and the mispricing of risk instead of 
creating this nonsense about over-regulation driving business away. 
 
MR. LANG: Jeff, isn’t that what regulatory reform is all about, that 
this was all crisis response?  Nobody wanted to be responsible.  
Everybody is to blame. 
The question is: can you have a system which anticipates this sort 
of thing, and that has people in power to act with full disclosure and 
transparency, so that we don’t run into this again?  I think that is the 
object — I hope — and that is the big lesson we have learned. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: You know what I also love?  There are two 
other things that are interesting in what we are going to do now.  We are 
going to now regulate the environment through cap-and-trade.  If you 
like credit default swaps, you’re going to love cap-and-trade. 
Can you imagine giving this to the financial markets to regulate?  
And by the way, it’s not new here.  This has been used overseas.  We 
didn’t create it. 
The other thing I love is that we are going to give systemic 
regulation to the Fed.  But what happens when you bring in one of these 
economists, like they had in the past, who do not believe in regulation?  
What are you going to do?  I don’t know if I would give it to the Fed, 
I’ll tell you that. 
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All right.  Some more questions from the audience.  Go ahead, sir. 
 
QUESTION: The story that made one of the points that I found 
most interesting is in regard to the individuals not being able to be 
contained by the governance and regulations that they are trying to 
impose.  The issue that I have been thinking about while listening to you 
is that, even if the individual boards were able to find some type of way 
to control the compensation packages, wouldn’t that just allow the best 
of the best to go to other firms?  They’ll be stealing the labor and going 
someplace else to work.  Greenhill and Lazard for the last year have 
been capturing a whole lot of new capital in that regard. 
Then, the question I have is: if that is the case, if the regulations do 
go into effect, wouldn’t that start a serious problem in the market, 
because if we didn’t have this big blowup, nobody would be crying 
about Wall Street?  It was a means for a lot of businesses to go out and 
to develop and to start up businesses for people to make huge amounts 
of money.  But it seemed to be good for the companies, and now that we 
have these problems, they say it’s not.  So what would happen if you 
started to regulate that and what would happen with liquidity in the 
markets? 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: I don’t think you can.  I would agree with that 
question that you raise, and I assume the answer that you gave.  But I’ll 
let Ms. Story talk about that.  I don’t think you can regulate.  That would 
really destroy — as much as our system can be criticized, but criticizing 
it on the kinds of things that I am talking about, where it doesn’t make 
sense — but to destroy our whole free enterprise system where people 
ought to be able to make — you know, their worth ought to be 
determined by what their value is and whatnot. 
What do you folks think? 
 
MR. NAFTALIS: Let me sound a slightly different note. With all 
the oversized expectations and hoopla out there, what seems to be 
getting lost a little bit is that most people who sit on corporate boards of 
public companies are honorable people trying to do the right thing. 
We should consider why do we have corporations and why do we 
have businesses?  In a capitalist system, they make products or perform 
services and make money for the owners of the business, the 
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shareholders.  That is a reason why you want good people to serve on 
these boards.  It is in the public interest that people who serve on 
corporate boards are dedicated to fulfill their fiduciary duties and 
enhance shareholder value.  We want people who are not going to be 
concerned about whether they are going to be unfairly criticized because 
they are not conforming to the passing view of how much money people 
should be paid. 
Jeff mentioned the Disney case as being wrongly decided.  I think it 
was rightly decided, since I tried it.  The Disney case is a good example 
of the gulf between reality and perception.  The Walt Disney Company 
had hired Michael Ovitz as President.  He didn’t succeed in this job and 
was paid a lot of money when he was terminated.  Everybody thought, 
“oh my God, the board was corrupt, the CEO was corrupt.  They just 
gave all this money to this guy for no good reason.”  That was the public 
perception, and that was the perception when we went tried the case. 
Except the facts really were different.  The facts were that there was 
a very good business reason why Ovitz was hired.  Michael Eisner, who 
I was privileged to represent in the trial, was the CEO of Disney and had 
had a phenomenal track record and had saved the company.  He then had 
a quadruple bypass and his number two at Disney, Frank Wells, died in 
a helicopter crash.  There was no potential successor to Eisner in the 
company and one was needed. 
Ovitz was considered to be magic in Hollywood at this time.  He 
was making a fortune running his talent agency, $20–25 million a year.  
So to get Ovitz to come to Disney, you had to offer him a compensation 
package where he wouldn’t lose money by making the move.  Nobody 
ever expected him to fail. 
So what we did in trying the case was to show that the directors 
properly exercised their fiduciary duties, made a rational business 
judgment in hiring Ovitz, and were properly informed both in hiring him 
and later in firing him.  That is how you want your boards to function. 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: Just don’t pay him the protection money if 
he’s fired for cause, as your client properly did, for egregious poor 
performance.  He had no defenders in there.  But don’t pay him $120 
million to leave. 
 
MR. NAFTALIS: But, see, that’s the problem of the misperception 
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of the case.  He wasn’t fired for cause.  The reason he wasn’t fired for 
cause was because the general counsel, Sandy Litvack, a very 
distinguished lawyer, formerly Assistant Attorney General in Charge of 
the Antitrust Division, opined, “we can’t fire him for cause.”  We put in 
evidence that Eisner had had endless conversations with Litvack saying, 
“can’t we find a way to fire him for cause?  I don’t want to pay this 
guy.”  But it was concluded by the general counsel that there were no 
legal grounds to terminate Ovitz for cause.  After all, they were in 
California, where the law is favorable for the employee. 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: But that is not necessarily the final answer.  
That was Litvack’s conclusion.  But the fact that he wasn’t showing up 
for work, that he had this polarizing effect on virtually every project — 
everything about him — there was nobody defending his conduct in 
there.  He just didn’t happen to kill anybody on the job.  But there 
wasn’t anybody who was defending his performance.  If he couldn’t be 
fired for cause, nobody can be fired for cause. 
 
MS. STORY: I think that’s a great point.  I think Ovitz is a lot like 
a Wall Street trader.  This is where I think people have acknowledged 
some of the problems with Wall Street pay.  You can have a Wall Street 
trader who comes in, and you think he’s a sure-fire winner, like Ovitz 
looked great for Walt Disney when they hired him, and so no one thinks 
he is going to make a bad trade, and blow the place up. 
The problem on Wall Street is that the upside for people who work 
there is infinite. 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: It’s not just Wall Street.  Carly Fiorina at 
HP, she cut her shareholder wealth in half and walked away with $75 
million.  Bob Nardelli cut his shareholder wealth in half and got twice as 
much at Home Depot.  It’s not just Wall Street.  It’s the failure of board 
backbone, and again, back to accountability. 
 
MR. NAFTALIS: Let me just finish one thing on Ovitz.  The 
reason Ovitz walked away with this package was that was what his 
contract provided, and he was the beneficiary of a “perfect storm.”  
Ovitz was not a great success as president, and most of the time when 
the CEO or the COO does a lousy job, the stock price goes down.  
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That’s normally how the world works. 
In spite of Ovitz’s performance, Disney’s stock went up 25% 
during the fourteen months he served as president.  Why he made most 
of his money was not because of the fixed salary or severance payouts in 
his contract.  It was because the increased stock prices made his stock 
options very, very valuable.  He was in the right place at the right time. 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: If shareholder price was the determinant, 
we wouldn’t need courts and juries and judges and this whole building 
and the people here, because certainly you look at a lot of companies 
with soaring performance that had, say, options back-dating.  You could 
use your argument and say, “gee, let’s not police any of those prominent 
name-brand CEOs at United Healthcare or things like that, because look 
how well the shareholders are doing.  Why hurt them?”  But in fact they 
broke the law.  Isn’t the law superior to the shareholder performance? 
 
MR. LANG: But not the contract.  Term contracts are customarily 
terminable for cause which is defined, but realistically results in a 
limited termination right.  The term does not depend on the performance 
of a corporation or the individual executive, and legal violations as cause 
are limited by definition.  Stock price is often more directly related to 
compensation than the termination of the employment agreement. 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: By the way, I was going to congratulate 
you on having so efficiently captured the notion of the nobility of so 
many board directors stepping in there, until you went down that Disney 
path.  You of course know more than I, but I have opinions anyway.  I 
actually love the way you phrased it, Gary.  You said it much more 
eloquently than I would have.   
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Any more questions? 
Yes, there’s a gentleman in the rear. 
 
QUESTION: I worked at Citibank for twenty years before it lost its 
ethical balance.  I’d like to just share an anecdote with you. 
About thirty years ago, Citibank bought a large German bank, and 
we really, I must say, didn’t know all we should have when we bought 
the bank.  But it turned out that in order to put somebody on the board of 
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supervisors, that person had to take personal financial responsibility for 
any bank failure. 
The lawyers searched around and searched around, and if the bank 
guaranteed it, then it violated the rule.  It was only when a very, very 
competent and very self-confident manager at the bank said, “I’ll step up 
and do it and I’ll take the responsibility,” that we were able to put 
somebody on.  I remember the anecdote.  It’s very funny. 
I just want to make a very quick observation.  When discussions of 
compensation come up, somehow we never talk about the real driving 
function behind compensation, which is earnings.  We are obviously 
manic about earnings. 
Now, it’s a little bit out of the box, but maybe our current definition 
of earnings is a little out of date.  We define earnings almost the way 
you would define how much a candy store makes.  But we don’t take 
into account all of the other factors that a corporation deals with as part 
of our society.  It’s a little bit out of the box, but — 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: No.  A lot of the things that should come 
out of even Goldman Sachs, and JP Morgan and others now, at least 
have multiyear clawbacks and things, so that if the performance fails — 
I know you were talking about much more in terms of social impact, 
community, and the rest, but at least in terms of sustained performance 
after they get their cash, that can be recovered if the place fails 
afterwards, if the deals collapse afterwards.  These are some major 
voluntary changes that even Wall Street has been bringing in.  So you’re 
right, I think it was too narrowly focused on the short term. 
 
QUESTIONER: I just want to make one more observation about 
how accounting is not keeping up with where we are.  It has been 
observed that when Microsoft calculates its assets, those assets are the 
buildings and computers that it owns.  Well, those are the least important 
assets in the company.  We have walked away from dealing with the 
problem of real assets, which is the knowledge base they have put 
together.  That is just an example of where perhaps it is the accountants 
that are failing us right now. 
 
PROF. SONNENFELD: Well, if the accountants took on this panel 
with me off of it, they would depreciate by age, and wouldn’t that be a 
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mistake? 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Any further questions we have?  Have we 
spent our time?  Are we over our time? 
 
VOICE: We’re over. 
 
JUDGE SPORKIN: Well, thank you for coming. 
 
